Geithner's put

Remember I was mentioning the missing puzzle piece on how to value those toxic assets yesterday? It turns out my question was partially irrelevant because it is almost impossible to find out--just too many counter-parties to claim on each other. To quote Buffett "Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease: It’s not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are sleeping with." Most of them are mark-to-model or mark-to-myth. However, if you can draw enough speculators/investors that are good at playing probability - you may get it off the ground. Interesting post by Nemo on self-evident blog and also Paul Krugman.(Click on the links to read the their postings). Part of Nemo post is reproduce here.

The details of the “Geithner Put” have been released. It has two parts: One to deal specifically with bad loans, the other to deal with other legacy assets (securitized yadda yadda). In this post I will discuss the first part, dubbed the “Legacy Loans Program”.

The Treasury helpfully provides an example, which I reproduce here:

Step 1: If a bank has a pool of residential mortgages with $100 face value that it is seeking to divest, the bank would approach the FDIC.

Step 2: The FDIC would determine, according to the above process, that they would be willing to leverage the pool at a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio.

Step 3: The pool would then be auctioned by the FDIC, with several private sector bidders submitting bids. The highest bid from the private sector – in this example, $84 – would be the winner and would form a Public-Private Investment Fund to purchase the pool of mortgages.

Step 4: Of this $84 purchase price, the FDIC would provide guarantees for $72 of financing, leaving $12 of equity.

Step 5: The Treasury would then provide 50% of the equity funding required on a side-by-side basis with the investor. In this example, Treasury would invest approximately $6, with the private investor contributing $6.

Step 6: The private investor would then manage the servicing of the asset pool and the timing of its disposition on an ongoing basis – using asset managers approved and subject to oversight by the FDIC.

Let’s flesh this out by repeating it 100 times. So say a bank has 100 of these $100 loan pools. And just by way of example, suppose half of them are actually worth $100 and half of them are actually worth zero, and nobody knows which are which. (These numbers are made up but the principle is sound. Nobody knows what the assets are really worth because it depends on future events, like who actually defaults on their mortgages.)

Thus, on average the pools are worth $50 each and the true value of all 100 pools is $5000.

The FDIC provides 6:1 leverage to purchase each pool, and some investor (e.g., a private equity firm) takes them up on it, bidding $84 apiece. Between the FDIC leverage and the Treasury matching funds, the private equity firm thus offers $8400 for all 100 pools but only puts in $600 of its own money.

Half of the pools wind up worthless, so the investor loses $300 total on those. But the other half wind up worth $100 each for a $16 profit. $16 times 50 pools equals $800 total profit which is split 1:1 with the Treasury. So the investor gains $400 on these winning pools. A $400 gain plus a $300 loss equals a $100 net gain, so the investor risked $600 to make $100, a tidy 16.7% return.

The bank unloaded assets worth $5000 for $8400. So the private investor gained $100, the Treasury gained $100, and the bank gained $3400. Somebody must therefore have lost $3600…

…and that would be the FDIC, who was so foolish as to offer 6:1 leverage to purchase assets with a 50% chance of being worthless. But no worries. As long as the FDIC has more expertise in valuing toxic assets than the entire private equity and banking worlds combined, there is no way they could be taken to the cleaners like this. What could possibly go wrong?

This program is for big guys who are running multi-billion or trillion dollar money management like Pimco or BlackRock. Since they have big amount money to buy a large cross-section of assets, odds may be in their favor to make some money. The question is still at what price buyers and sellers will strike a deal. 84? 71? or 50? on face value of $ 100. Bargaining power will depend how well capitalized a bank is, weak banks will have no choice to give in. Can I start shopping for champagne? Probably buy one small bottle before a big one like in Formula 1.